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State v. Johns12/5/2000
ing to Johns, when Stewart confronted Johns and Tedder the second time, "a vehicle chase ensued." And Deputy Peppinger reiterated that a "chase" occurred in defense counsel's cross-examination of him. The evidence was that Stewart chased Johns and Tedder in his truck on Highway KK. When they stopped, Stewart broke out the windows on Tedder's car and knocked Johns to the ground. Thus, clearly there was evidence of a chase. And when the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection, the jury was in effect told that there was no chase.
The state contends that the prosecutor's objection occurred because the prosecutor thought that Johns' attorney was talking about a foot chase. Perhaps the trial court was under the same impression when it sustained the objection. In any event, it is irrelevant what their impression was, because the evidence supported the argument that there was indeed a chase.
The state also contends that there was no prejudice to Johns for this apparent mistake over whether a chase occurred, because Johns was still permitted to argue to the jury about his statement to the police on the subject of Stewart chasing Johns and Tedder in a truck, forcing them to stop, and the facts of the case that were consistent with Johns' statement. The portion of defense counsel's final argument that the state says cures the prejudice is as follows:
Mr. Johns said in his statement that the State introduced as evidence that Mr. Stewart was behind them and made them stop and the car was parked at that angle. The question is--if someone who--on a dark highway like that, is it unreasonable to be afraid of serious physical injury to yourself or someone else with you--or death? Is that unreasonable? Was it unreasonable of the people out there to think that some harm might come to them? Maybe they would get run off the road. Maybe Mr. Stewart would do something like Mr. Johns said--breaking windows. There's evidence to support that.
What the State has done is they've presented you a scenario where you could come up with a hundred different possible things that could happen on the physical evidence that has been presented to you. They want you to make--take the evidence and make inferences from that evidence, which you are absolutely allowed to do. But they only want you to make one possible inference.
Despite the state's claim that Johns' counsel was able to cure any possible prejudice due to this follow-up statement, Johns' counsel was clearly not able effectively to argue that Stewart "chased them down." To the contrary, the jury heard from both the prosecution and the judge that a "chase" did not happen. Instead the jury received a much softer version -- that "Mr. Stewart was behind them and made them stop and the car was parked at that angle." This is not the equivalent of being "chased down." Worse yet, this all occurred at the beginning of John's counsel's closing argument, which might have left an even stronger impression in the jurors' minds that a chase did not occur.
In summary, Johns was precluded from introducing evidence that was critical to his self-defense theory, and his counsel's argument to the jury was contradicted by the trial court's ruling as to the fact of a chase. The error occurred, and it was certainly prejudicial. Accordingly, I would grant a new trial and, thus, dissent from the principal opinion.
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