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Teaster v. State10/27/2000
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Laclede County, Hon. Mary Dickerson
Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED.
Parrish, P.J., and Montgomery, J., concur.
Opinion:
This is a Rule 29.15 case in which the motion court denied the request of Michael Teaster ("Movant") for post-conviction relief. The denial came after the court held an evidentiary hearing. Movant appeals, charging the motion court clearly erred in rejecting two of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We disagree. We affirm the motion court's denial of Movant's motion for post-conviction relief.
A jury convicted Movant of felony driving while intoxicated ("DWI"), section 577.010. Movant had multiple convictions, so the trial court imposed sentence. See section 558.016 and section 577.023. Movant appealed the judgment in his criminal case, and this court's affirmance of that judgment is reported in State v. Teaster, 962 S.W.2d 429 (Mo.App. 1998). Thereon, Movant timely filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 29.15. Counsel was appointed, an amended motion filed, and the motion was denied without an evidentiary hearing. An appeal from the denial of that motion was taken, and this court reversed and remanded to the circuit court with directions to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Teaster v. State, 986 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Mo.App. 1999). The motion court concluded Movant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. This appeal followed. We affirm.
In his only point on appeal, Movant charges, in two subparts, he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the underlying criminal case because his trial counsel "failed to investigate and call Lowell Mason ["Witness"] at trial" and "argued to the jury that [Movant] 'was sobering up'" at the time of the traffic stop and arrest. Movant asserts Witness could have easily been located and would have provided a viable defense to the charge. Furthermore, Movant claims the "sobering up" comment during counsel's closing argument amounted to an admission of guilt and was not reasonable trial strategy.
Appellate review of a denial of a Rule 29.15 motion is limited to determining whether the findings and conclusions of the motion court are clearly erroneous. Rule 29.15(k); State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905, 928 (Mo.banc 1992). "The . . . findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only if, after a review of the entire record, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Id. at 928 .
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show: First, that trial counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances; and, second, that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This prejudice is shown where "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
To obtain relief, a movant must prove both the performance and the prejudice prongs of the Strickland test, and if he or she fails to satisfy either prong, we need not consider the other. State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 752, 772 (Mo.banc 1997). In reviewing the performance prong, a movant must overcome a strong presumption that movant's trial counsel acted competently. Leisure v. State, 528 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Mo.banc 1992).
In Movant's first contention, he claims tri
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