 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Swartz12/28/2000
ay and empty lot. Consequently, the State's only burden was to prove that Swartz operated a motor vehicle within Montana. Finally, the District Court's Instruction Nos. 24 and 25, read together, accurately instructed the jury of the State's burden in this regard. We conclude that the District Court's jury instructions fairly instructed the jury on the law regarding the offense of being a habitual traffic offender operating a motor vehicle.
13 Swartz also reiterates his District Court argument that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the court's jury instructions regarding § 61-11-213, MCA. It is well-established that counsel's failure to object does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel when the objection lacks merit and properly would have been overruled by the court. See, e.g., Kills on Top v. State (1995), 273 Mont. 32, 51, 901 P.2d 1368, 1385; State v. Baker (1995), 272 Mont. 273, 285, 901 P.2d 54, 61; Dawson v. State, 2000 MT 219, 108, 10 P.3d 49, 108, 57 St.Rep. 883, 108; State v. Raugust, 2000 MT 146, 45, 300 Mont. 54, 45, 3 P.3d 115, 45.
Having concluded above that the District Court's jury instructions regarding the offense of being a habitual traffic offender operating a motor vehicle fairly stated the law, we further conclude that any objection to those instructions properly would have been overruled and the failure of Swartz's trial counsel to object to those instructions did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
14 We hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Swartz's motion for a new trial based on improper jury instructions.
15 Affirmed.
KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
JAMES C. NELSON
JIM REGNIER
TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
|