State v. Davis12/21/2000
xamination." State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 411, 508 S.E.2d 496, 514 (1998). The prosecution may offer evidence of a pertinent trait of a defendant's character to rebut evidence of a pertinent trait of character when first offered by the defendant. See Carter, 338 N.C. at 598, 451 S.E.2d at 173.
In the present case, defendant introduced evidence on cross- examination that he was a good worker. Subsequently, defendant's first witness, his mother, was questioned about or testified on direct- examination as to the following: defendant worked at Food Lion and Bi-Lo, played football and basketball, had taken the SAT to try to get into college, had been admitted to college, took a test to gain admission into the Air Force, and had a girlfriend he took to the prom. Subsequent defense witnesses testified that defendant was polite, had a good attitude, was an overachiever, and behaved appropriately in school.
On cross-examination, the State elicited evidence from defendant's mother and other defense witnesses that defendant sold and used illegal drugs, had parties in hotel rooms, pushed his grandfather down, slapped his girlfriend, had been charged with and convicted of drug offenses, and violated jail rules.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting this cross-examination that was offered in rebuttal of defendant's evidence of good character.
In his sixth argument, defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine a witness about defendant's conduct in Spanish class. Defendant argues that admission of this evidence violated settled evidence rules as well as the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. We disagree.
The rules of evidence do not apply to a sentencing hearing, N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 1101(b)(3), yet hearsay statements introduced therein must be relevant and bear indicia of reliability, State v. Stephens, 347 N.C. 352, 363, 493 S.E.2d 435, 442 (1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 831, 142 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1998).
In the present case, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence about an incident in his Spanish class, but the trial court deferred ruling on this motion.
On direct examination, Stephen Chandler, defendant's history teacher and football coach in 1995, testified for the defense that defendant never had a behavioral problem, always participated in class, came to practice on time, and was never a discipline problem. On cross- examination, when the prosecutor asked Chandler about an incident in Spanish class, the trial court held a voir dire. Over objection, Chandler testified that another math teacher had told him that he heard defendant "had gotten in trouble" and had engaged in "aggressive" behavior towards his Spanish teacher. Defendant contends that these statements were double-hearsay since Chandler had no personal knowledge of the incident.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the cross-examination by the State that served to rebut defendant's evidence that defendant was not a behavior problem in school. Further, since defendant did not object to the admission of the statements on constitutional grounds, we review this issue for plain error. See State v. Lemons, 352 N.C. 87, 530 S.E.2d 542 (2000). After reviewing the record, we find no error so fundamental that justice could not have been done.
In his seventh argument, defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence on cross-examination of the food defendant ate in jail, including numerous candy bars, soft drinks, and snacks.
We note that defendant did not object when the State first as
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