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Rott v. North Dakota Department of Transportation10/3/2000
district court and on appeal is that the statute, as applied to her, is unconstitutional because it is retroactive and an ex post facto punishment and because it violates her due process rights.
[ ] The department asserts Rott's ex post facto challenge should fail because the department did not apply N.D.C.C. § 39-06-01.1 retroactively. A statute is applied retroactively if it operates on transactions that have already occurred, or on rights existing before its enactment. Glaspie v. Little, 1997 ND 108, 5, 564 N.W.2d 651. According to the department, because the effective date of the statute was August 1, 1999, and the traffic offense occurred on October 14, 1999, the application of the statute is not retroactive.
[ ] Rott argues that because she held a class D driver's license nearly two years before the effective date of N.D.C.C. § 39-06-01.1, and because N.D.C.C. § 39-06-01.1 affected her right to her driver's license by changing her driver's license status, the statute was applied retroactively.
[ ] In Reiling v. Bhattacharyya, 276 N.W.2d 237, 239 (N.D. 1979), this Court explained retroactivity as follows:
A statute is applied retroactively when it is applied to a cause of action that arose prior to the effective date of the statute. A statute is applied prospectively when it is applied to a cause of action that arose subsequent to the effective date of the statute. Applying that rationale, in State v. Haverluk, 432 N.W.2d 871, 873-74 (N.D. 1988), this Court held a statute providing increased penalties for repeat DUI offenders was not applied retroactively merely because the prior offense occurred before the effective date of the statute, when the current offense occurred after that date.
[ ] Here, N.D.C.C. § 39-06-01.1 became effective August 1, 1999. Rott's license cancellation resulted from an offense on October 14, 1999. Consistent with our holding in Haverluk, N.D.C.C. § 39-06-01.1 was not applied retroactively to Rott. The offense triggering the cancellation of Rott's license occurred subsequent to the effective date of the statute. Accordingly, Rott's ex post facto argument is without merit.
[ ] Rott also argues the enactment of N.D.C.C. § 39-06-01.1 changed the status of her driver's license, affecting her property interest in her driver's license. Because she was not notified of the status change, Rott contends her due process rights were violated.
[ ] The mere enactment of N.D.C.C. § 39-06-01.1 did not change the status of Rott's license. Rott held a class D driver's license before and after the August 1, 1999, effective date of N.D.C.C. § 39-06-01.1. Rather, the enactment of N.D.C.C. § 39-06-01.1 changed the consequence of Rott's subsequent traffic conviction. Accordingly, Rott was not entitled to notice of the enactment of N.D.C.C. § 39-06-01.1.
[ ] The district court's judgment reversing the department's decision to cancel Rott's driver's license is reversed.
[ ]William A. Neumann
Mary Muehlen Maring
Carol Ronning Kapsner
Dale V. Sandstrom
Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.
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