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State v. Patterson12/5/2000
Grafton
The defendant, Ronald F. Patterson, Jr., appeals from an order of the Superior Court (Fitzgerald, J.) denying his petition to annul his criminal record. We affirm.
On March 11, 1991, the defendant was convicted of selling and conspiring to sell a controlled drug, both class A felonies, under RSA 318-B:2 (Supp. 1991). He received two concurrent five-to-ten-year sentences, which the court deferred for two years, and was placed on probation for two years. In February 1993, on motion of the defendant, the court suspended his sentences for a period of ten years.
In October 1995, the superior court denied without prejudice the defendant's petition to annul his criminal record (the first petition), but authorized him to "reapply" for annulment after March 11, 1998. The court relied on RSA 318-B:28-a (1995), which prohibits an annulment of a felony conviction under the Controlled Drug Act (RSA chapter 318-B) for a period of seven years after the date of conviction.
In June 1998, without a hearing, the superior court denied without prejudice the defendant's second petition to annul (the second petition). The court relied on RSA 651:5, III(e) (1996), which permits petitions to annul a conviction for a class A felony to be filed ten years after the completion of all terms and conditions of a sentence. The trial court concluded that the defendant's petition was "premature" because his sentences were suspended in 1993 for ten years and could be brought forward and imposed at any time during that period. Accordingly, the court ruled that the ten-year period prescribed by RSA 651:5, III(e) would not begin to run until 2003. This appeal followed.
RSA 318-B:28-a reads:
No court shall order an annulment, pursuant to RSA 651:5 or any other provision of law, of any record of conviction for a felony under [the Controlled Drug Act] until 7 years after the date of conviction. (Emphasis added.) RSA 651:5, III reads, in pertinent part:
Except as provided in RSA 265:82-c or in paragraphs V and VI, any person convicted of an offense may petition for annulment of the record of arrest, conviction and sentence when the petitioner has completed all the terms and conditions of the sentence and has thereafter been convicted of no other crime, except a motor vehicle offense classified as a violation other than driving while intoxicated under RSA 265:82, for a period of time as follows:
(d) For a class B felony except as provided in subparagraph (g), 5 years.
(e) For a class A felony, 10 years. (Emphasis added.)
The defendant, advancing an analysis of the statutes' legislative history, argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the ten-year provision of RSA 651:5 preempts the seven-year provision of RSA 318-B:28-a. We disagree.
This court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole, and when the issue raised presents a new question of statutory construction, we begin our analysis with an examination of the statutory language . . . . It is well settled that principles of statutory interpretation require us to construe the law in a manner consistent with its plain meaning, when possible. Cheever v. Southern N.H. Regional Med. Ctr., 141 N.H. 589, 590-91, 688 A.2d 565, 566-67 (1997) (citations, quotations, brackets, and ellipsis omitted).
Because we resolve the statutory interpretation issues involved in this case from the plain meaning of RSA 318-B:28-a and RSA 651:5, III(d) and (e), we need not address the defendant's legislative history argument. Id. at 592, 688 A.2d at 567.
The lang
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