State v. Johnson12/20/2000
A>(relying on the definition of "highway" in NMSA 1978, § 66-1-4.8(B) (1991)). In conformity with Wenger, the Court of Appeals, by memorandum opinion, upheld the district court's order dismissing the charges against Mr. Johnson. Neither Mr. Wenger nor Mr. Johnson challenge the finding that they were in actual physical control of their vehicles. Likewise, the State agrees that the defendants were on private property at the time of their arrests.
II.
This Court must determine whether the Legislature intended to place a geographical limitation on the offense of DWI depending on the type of activity constituting the "driving" of a vehicle. To resolve this issue we must ascertain and interpret the Legislature's intent in drafting the statutes governing this offense. The standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and construction is de novo. See State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111, 114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1995).
The issue presented herein necessitates the interpretation of Section 66-8-102, NMSA 1978, § 66-7-2 (1978), and NMSA 1978, § 66-1- 4.4(K) (1991, prior to 1999 amendment). As we engage in our interpretation of these statutes we keep in mind basic rules of statutory construction. "The starting point in every case involving the construction of a statute is an examination of the language utilized by [the Legislature]" in drafting the pertinent statutory provisions. State v. Wood, 117 N.M. 682, 685, 875 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Ct. App. 1994). "When a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation." State v. Jonathan M., 109 N.M. 789, 790, 791 P.2d 64, 65 (1990); accord State v. Shije, 1998-NMCA-102, 6, 125 N.M. 581, 964 P.2d 142. The plain meaning rule, however, is only a guideline for determining the legislative intent. Junge v. John D. Morgan Constr. Co., 118 N.M. 457, 463, 882 P.2d 48, 54 (Ct. App. 1994). It is the responsibility of this Court to search for and effectuate the purpose and object of the underlying statutes. See State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994). These statutes should be harmonized and construed together when possible, in a way that facilitates achievement of their goals. See State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar, 115 N.M. 573, 575-76, 855 P.2d 562, 564-65 (1993). Accordingly, we analyze these statutes not only within the statutory scheme of the Motor Vehicle Code but also within the context of the policy underlying the offense of DWI. The purpose of our DWI legislation is to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the people of New Mexico. See State v. Harrison, 115 N.M. 73, 77, 846 P.2d 1082, 1086 (Ct. App. 1992); see also Incorporated County of Los Alamos v. Johnson, 108 N.M. 633, 634, 776 P.2d 1252, 1253 (1989). We must adhere to this policy as we analyze the applicable statutory provisions.
III.
Our interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions leads us to the conclusion that there is no public/private property distinction in our DWI law. Section 66-8-102 states in pertinent part: "It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive any vehicle within this state." Section 66-8-102(A) (emphasis added). The only geographical limitation to the offense of DWI is found in the operative words "within this state." The plain meaning of "within this state" is quite broad and does not specify a distinction between public and private property in the interior of the State of New Mexico. We cannot ignore the Legislature's choice of words, especially when the Legislature has used more specific phraseology when it has inte
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