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State v. Gowen11/24/2003
Following a trial on stipulated facts, the defendant, Kenneth Gowen, was convicted of being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon, see RSA 159:3 (1994) (amended 2001), driving while intoxicated, subsequent offense, see RSA 265:82 (Supp. 2002); RSA 265:82-b, II (Supp. 2001) (amended 2001), and operating after suspension, see RSA 263:64 (1993) (amended 2002). On appeal, the defendant contends that the Superior Court (Manias, J.) erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his pickup truck. We affirm.
At the suppression hearing, Corporal Eric Bourn of the Epsom Police Department testified that on December 2, 2001, at 12:20 a.m., he was parked near the Epsom traffic circle next to the cruiser of Corporal Wayne Preve, another Epsom officer. While the two officers were talking, a green Dodge pickup truck pulled up next to them. The driver of the truck pointed at another green pickup truck that was headed westbound on Route 4 out of the traffic circle and stated that "she believed the driver of that truck was intoxicated."
Bourn pulled out onto Route 4 to stop the truck while Preve remained behind to gather information from the reporting driver. As Bourn pursued the truck, he did not observe the truck speeding, weaving or being operated in an erratic manner. After approximately one mile, Bourn caught up to the truck, pulled it over and approached the driver's side of the truck. During his conversation with the driver, he made observations leading him to believe the driver was intoxicated and placed him under arrest.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the conclusory information the anonymous driver provided to the police did not amount to the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop his truck. The defendant's brief relies exclusively on Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution and so we address only that claim.
In reviewing the trial court's ruling that the stop in this case was justified, we will defer to its factual findings on the events leading up to the stop, unless those findings are clearly erroneous; we review de novo, however, the ultimate determination of whether, in view of those findings of historical fact, reasonable suspicion existed.
State v. McBreairty, 142 N.H. 12, 14 (1997).
The police may stop a person driving on the open highway provided that "the stop is based on a reasonable suspicion that the person detained had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime and the officer is able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." Id. (quotation omitted). When the facts upon which the officer relies to make the stop do not stem from personal observation, but instead come from an informant, "we [must] examine the reliability and credibility of the informant, and his or her basis of knowledge, and then make a final judgment according to the totality of the circumstances." State v. Melanson, 140 N.H. 199, 201 (1995) (quotation omitted).
The defendant argues that the stop of his truck lacked reasonable suspicion because: (1) the police lacked facts that established the reliability or credibility of the anonymous informant; (2) the police failed to establish the anonymous informant's basis of knowledge; and (3) Bourn's observations of the defendant's truck dispelled any suspicion that he was driving under the influence. We address each argument in turn.
The defendant first argues that the police lacked facts that established the reliability or credibility of the anonymous informant. We disagree with the defendant that the driver who provided the infor
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