 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Spangenberg v. State10/18/2000
We have no objection. They can be admitted, that's fine." Accordingly, the evidence was admitted. Now, on appeal, Spangenberg argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the prior convictions.
According to Spangenberg, because he stipulated to the two prior convictions alleged in the indictment, the State should have been prohibited from proving those or any other prior convictions during its case in chief. Spangenberg argues that such evidence only serves to improperly prove the defendant's bad character and inflame the jury's prejudice. In support of this position, Spangenberg relies on Tamez v. State, 11 S.W.2d 3d 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
In Tamez, the court of criminal appeals held that in felony DWI cases in which the defendant agrees to stipulate to the two jurisdictional DWI convictions, "the proper balance is struck when the State reads the indictment at the beginning of trial, mentioning only the two jurisdictional prior convictions, but is foreclosed from presenting evidence of the convictions during its case-in-chief." Tamez, 11 S.W.3d at 202. While the rule in Tamez appears to apply to the facts in the present case, Tamez had not been decided when Spangenberg's case was tried. Nevertheless, Spangenberg argues for the application of the rule in Tamez on two bases. First, he contends that the rule established in Tamez is not a new rule; that it was in effect at the time of his trial by virtue of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Old Chief v. U.S., 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
Old Chief involved the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Because any type of previous felony conviction was sufficient to prosecute the defendant for possession of a firearm in that case, the Court determined that the prejudicial effect of allowing the government to prove the particular underlying felony outweighed the probative value of such evidence. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 192. The Court concluded that the government was precluded from proving what felony the defendant was previously convicted of if the defendant stipulated that he was indeed a felon. See id.
Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relied on Old Chief in deciding Tamez, it noted that Old Chief was not binding authority. See Tamez, 11 S.W.3d at 201. Accordingly, Spangenberg's argument that his case, though tried before Tamez, was controlled by Old Chief is erroneous. Because there was no established rule regarding whether the State could prove prior convictions in a felony DWI case in Texas at the time of Spangenberg's trial, Spangenberg's first issue is overruled.
Acknowledging that this court might determine that Tamez created a new rule in Texas, Spangenberg raises an alternate argument for the application of Tamez to his case. According to Spangenberg, Tamez should be applied retroactively. Spangenberg relies on Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), for the proposition that newly created rules regarding the conduct of criminal prosecutions are to be applied retroactively in all cases. See id. at 327.
The court of criminal appeals, however, has specifically rejected the Griffith approach as too rigid in dealing with the application of non-constitutional new rules. See Taylor v. State, 10 S.W.3d 673, 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The court in Taylor conducted an extensive analysis of the scope and effect of doctrines relating to the retroactivity of new rules and concluded by adopting a balancing test for determining whether new rules of non-constitutional origin should be given retroactive effect. See id. at 677-81. Under this balancing test, a court must weigh the following three factors: 1) the purpose to be served by the new standa
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Texas DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|