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Spangenberg v. State10/18/2000
rds, 2) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and 3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. See id. at 678 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967)). If a new rule significantly impacts the jury's truth-finding function, the factors will generally balance in favor of retroactive application. See id. at 683.
Even if a rule is retroactively imposed, however, a defendant may still be denied relief if the error was not properly preserved. See id. In this case, Spangenberg waived any error he might have had regarding the admission of his previous convictions when his attorney stated, "We've reviewed that, Your Honor. We have no objection. They can be admitted, that's fine," when the evidence was offered.
The facts of Tamez itself indicate the necessity of an objection to the type of evidence that is at issue. The Tamez court clearly points out that when the State introduced evidence of the appellant's previous DWI convictions, it was "again over his objection." See Tamez, 11 S.W.3d at 199. Because Spangenberg not only failed to object when his previous convictions were introduced, but invited the court to admit them, he is precluded from complaining on appeal that they were admitted. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Spangenberg's second issue is overruled.
B. Admission of Evidence
Before trial began, the trial court conducted a hearing on Spangenberg's motion to suppress portions of the audio on the videotape made at the scene. Specifically, Spangenberg sought to have the conversation between Officer Jennings and Spangenberg's passenger, Miguel Arizola suppressed. Apparently, Jennings and Arizola discussed Arizola's past convictions for drug offenses while Jennings questioned Arizola at the scene. During the hearing, Spangenberg based his request on the fact that evidence of Arizola's extraneous convictions was both irrelevant and prejudicial to Spangenberg's case. The State agreed, and the trial court entered an order, which granted the motion to suppress, but limited the exclusion to "those statements or admissions made by the passenger."
During trial, the State called Miguel Arizola to the stand. When asked whether he ever told Officer Jennings that Spangenberg had had more to drink than he had, Arizola stated that he did not remember saying that and, if he did, it was only to protect himself. The State then offered into evidence, for impeachment purposes, a portion of the videotape made at the scene, in which Arizola states that Spangenberg had more to drink than he had. The trial court admitted the evidence after ensuring that the tape was edited to exclude any reference to Arizola's extraneous offenses.
The admission of evidence is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and, as such, is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 378-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). As long as the trial court's ruling was within the "zone of reasonable disagreement," it will be upheld. Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). According to Spangenberg, the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to introduce Arizola's statement to Jennings as impeachment evidence because the State offered it for the purpose of placing before the jury inadmissible evidence. Spangenberg contends that the evidence was harmful because it created a false comparison between him and Arizola regarding a key issue before the jury.
Spangenberg argues that the portion of the videotape that was introduced by the State was inadmissible because it had been previously suppressed by the trial cou
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