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State v. Houpt6/1/2004
t "[when] a trial court fails, after specific request by the defendant, to define a word which makes up an essential element of the crime charged, such failure is prejudicial error requiring reversal." State v. Bridger, 223 Neb. 250, 256, 388 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1986). The Bridger case implies that a trial court is not required to define such terms if a definition is not requested by the defendant and the term has such a generally understood and accepted meaning that no instruction is necessary. Houpt notes that the jury submitted a written question to the court seeking a definition of "wanton disregard," to which the court provided a written response indicating, "You have all of the Instructions you will receive." Houpt argues that this shows the jury was confused and that the district court's instructions were inadequate.
While the jury may not have generally understood the term "wanton," we are not inclined to say that the word "wanton" comprises an essential element of the crime of reckless driving such that the trial court's failure to define the term on Houpt's request constituted reversible error. We again refer to § 60-6,213, which states that "[a]ny person who drives any motor vehicle in such a manner as to indicate an indifferent or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property shall be guilty of reckless driving." (Emphasis supplied.) Much of the key terminology contained in the complex definition proffered by Houpt, namely the concepts of "indifference" and "disregard for others," was encompassed in the more succinct instruction based on § 60-6,213 given by the trial court. Houpt's proffered instruction does little to illuminate a more precise meaning for the term "wanton." A simple dictionary definition might have proven more useful, see Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 1608 (1989) (defining "wanton" as "without regard for what is right"), but Houpt did not proffer such an instruction. Because the substance of Houpt's requested instruction was covered in the instructions given, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to give Houpt's requested instruction. See State v. Quintana, 261 Neb. 38, 621 N.W.2d 121 (2001).
VI. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the district court did not err in admitting the results of Houpt's blood test into evidence or in denying his motion in limine or motion to suppress. We further conclude that the district court did not err in refusing Houpt's proffered jury instructions or in giving the instructions complained of by Houpt.
Affirmed.
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