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State v. Boyea12/1/2000
6, 571 A.2d 627, 638 (1989) (role of this Court is limited to reviewing trial court findings to determine if they are supported by the record). The State has made no showing that the nature of the tip demonstrated firsthand knowledge, or any basis for knowledge, other than that it identified a particular car on the highway. As the J.L. concurrence observed, there might be other characteristics of the tip that support its reliability, such as predictive value, prior accurate tips, a face-to-face encounter, or a narrow class of likely informants. J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1381 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); see also State v. Lamb, 168 Vt.194, 720 A.2d 1101 (1998) (where tip content indicated, inter alia, that it came from one of two women in household with named defendant, it provided reasonable suspicion). Where the State provides no evidence, however, that "the dispatcher or arresting officer had any objective basis to believe that this tip had some particular indicia of reliability," it does not provide a lawful basis for police action. J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1381.
Because the claim here is based solely on the Fourth Amendment, we must ask ourselves how the United States Supreme Court would be likely to rule about the anonymous tip in this case after White and J.L. The majority says we can predict nothing from White and J.L. because this case involves a car. The majority's rule is that if an automobile-operation crime is alleged, then the crime is so dangerous that police need not have reliable information. This "automobile" exception has no basis in Supreme Court precedent. To the extent there was a "dangerousness" exception developing in the lower courts based on guns, automobiles, and drugs , see 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4 (h), at 230 (3rd ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001), that development has been curtailed by the Supreme Court. The J.L. Court rejected the developing exception for guns and pointed out that creating such exceptions could swallow the rule of reliability. " n automatic firearm exception to our established reliability analysis would rove too far," concluded the Court, and no one "could . . . securely confine such an exception to allegations involving firearms." J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1380. It is now less likely that another exception, for automobiles, will emerge after J.L.
This Court's decision in Lamb reasoned that the principle of the gun-exception cases could be extended to the situation of drunk-driving. See Lamb, 168 Vt. at 200, 720 A.2d at 1105. The reasoning of those gun cases has been criticized by the J.L. Court, however, see J.L. 120 S. Ct. at 1379-80, and the majority's continued reliance on Lamb's reasoning is troubling for that reason. The Lamb decision committed exactly the kind of expansion that the J.L. Court warned against by saying a firearm exception would be impossible to contain.
Used improperly, cars, guns, and a host of other instrumentalities may be dangerous to innocent people. A man carrying a concealed weapon on a street can easily remove the weapon and fire into a group of people faster than any police officer can intercept him. A loaded and concealed weapon is a danger our courts have been concerned with for years and it is the danger that justified the innovation of the Terry stop. See id. at 1379. A drunk driver of a car may cause a collision with another car or with pedestrians. Both dangers are serious and cannot be taken lightly. But if an unreliable, anonymous tip about a gun does not justify a Terry stop, than neither does an unreliable, anonymous tip about erratic driving.
Other jurisdictions interpreting the Fourth Amendment have rejected a rule that permits police to act on anonymous tips without c
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