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State v. Boyea12/1/2000
court considered three factors: the nature and specificity of the information conveyed; the extent of corroboration by the officer; and the urgency of effectuating a stop in the circumstances.
As to the nature of the information, the court noted that it contained a specific description of the car, its exact location at a moment in time, and its direction and prior movements, all of which "reasonably support a conclusion that the caller had personally observed the vehicle." Melanson, 665 A.2d at 340. Next, the court noted that the officer was able to determine within a few minutes of the call that the informant had accurately described the vehicle and its current location and direction, "support the complainant's credibility" and "the officer's conclusion that the informant had actually observed the reported behavior." Id.
Finally, the court recognized that "the officer faced the potential of a dangerous public safety hazard." Id. Unlike a situation where the information concerns the transportation of controlled substances, and the officer could safely observe the defendant to obtain additional incriminating information, here failure quickly to stop the defendant's vehicle in order to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions could have exposed the public as well as the defendant herself to the danger of an impaired driver. The officer's ability to observe incriminating behavior, therefore, was limited by the exigency of the situation. Id. (emphasis added).
In addition to the ruling by the New Hampshire court, Lamb also relied on the Kansas decision in State v. Tucker, 878 P.2d 855 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994), which again presented the scenario of an officer responding to a radio dispatch based upon an anonymous report of erratic driving. The caller described the vehicle, its location on the highway, and direction of travel. The officers located the car, followed a short distance, and - despite having observed no erratic driving - made an investigative stop which led to a DUI arrest. Applying an analysis similar to that in Melanson, the court observed that the anonymous tip suggested some firsthand knowledge, was corroborated by the police within a short time, and required immediate investigation in order to prevent potential injury to the driver and the public.
The Kansas court's discussion of the necessary balancing between the driver's constitutional right to privacy and the public's interest in safety bears repeating. That balancing, the court observed, "must consider the risk to the public of not making an immediate stop against the right of an individual to be free from such stops. We believe that, where the danger to the public is clear, urgent, and immediate, the equation must be weighted in favor of protecting the public and removing the danger." Id. at 861. Applying that equation to the case at bar, the court concluded that the risk of not making an immediate stop was "death and destruction on the highways. This is not a risk which the Fourth Amendment requires the public to take." Id. at 862.
Lamb did not stop there. In addition to Melanson and Tucker, it cited and relied on State v. Markus, 478 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (officers receiving anonymous tip of intoxicated driver did not have to observe erratic behavior "to stop the defendant and investigate this exigent circumstance"); People v. Rance, 644 N.Y.S.2d 447, 447 (App. Div. 1996) (police stop of reportedly intoxicated driver "may be based upon information from an anonymous source where, as here, it relates to 'matters gravely affecting personal or public safety'") (quoting People v. Taggart, 229 N.E.2d 581, 586 (N.Y. 1967)); and Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah Ct
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