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People v. Kraft8/10/2000
ion could link numerous entries on the list to uncharged victims suggests the list was what the prosecution contended it to be. In any event, the trial court's conclusion the document was admissible as a list of victims finds support in the record.
Defendant correctly observes that evidence leading only to speculative inferences is irrelevant. (People v. De La Plane (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 223, 244.) We do not agree, however, that because the entries were idiosyncratically coded and required interpretation to be understood by a reader, to ascribe a particular meaning to a given entry necessarily was speculative. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding each of the 13 entries reflected a sufficient nexus with some aspect or aspects of the particular case to be relevant and admissible.
Second, although the list constitutes hearsay, the trial court correctly ruled it admissible under the exception for statements by a party. (Evid. Code, § 1220.) Contrary to what defendant suggests, People v. Allen (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 426 did not hold that to qualify under this exception to the hearsay rule a statement must be clear and unambiguous. That case, rather, involved a statement, clear on its face, to which the prosecution sought to ascribe a different, inculpatory meaning not directly inferable therefrom; the Court of Appeal rejected the effort as speculative.
Third, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion the list was more probative than prejudicial, over defendant's objection pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. The list itself was not inflammatory; as redacted, it did not suggest defendant was guilty of other offenses. Despite the prosecutor's argument the entries on the list referred to specific victims, and thus corroborated the other incriminating evidence in the case, the defense could and did urge the jury to reject any correlations it found unreasonable. Presumably the jury accorded no weight to any entry it found did not relate to a charged victim. Admission of the list, therefore, would not have prejudiced defendant within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352. For this reason, too, even had the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the list, reversal of defendant's convictions would be unwarranted. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835-836.)
Finally, we reject defendant's contention that the admission of the list violated what he terms the heightened reliability requirements of the federal Constitution in capital cases. Application of the ordinary rules of evidence generally does not impermissibly infringe on a capital defendant's constitutional rights. (See People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611.) Defendant fails to persuade us this case constitutes an exception to that general rule.
3. Denial of Motion to Suppress
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized in searches of his house, car, business, and pharmacy records. He chronicles in minute detail the sequence of events from the time the California Highway Patrol pulled him over in the early hours of May 14, 1983, through the execution of the third (i.e., the May 18, 1983) warrant to search his residence. He also catalogues exhaustively the items seized in each search. Lacking, however, is any clear explanation of how most of the seized items were used against him, an omission that renders difficult a discussion of prejudice. In any case, we conclude the searches were constitutionally valid.
At the outset, we set forth the principles guiding our review of the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. Whereas the trial court's task is to find historical facts,
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