Raulerson v. State7/13/2000
As amended July 24, 2000
We have for review the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Raulerson v. State, 699 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); the First District Court of Appeal's decision in State v. Gloster, 703 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); and the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in State v. Keirn, 720 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), in which the district courts expressly declared that section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995), is constitutional. Further, we have for review Murray v. State, 701 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Lucio v. State, 701 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Austin v. State, 709 So. 2d 1389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Castro v. State, 710 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Harvey v. State, 710 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Gaillard v. State, 707 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Beebe v. State, 706 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Hawkins v. State, 748 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); and State v. Santiago, 713 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), which cited as controlling authority either Raulerson, Gloster, or Keirn. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; see also Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981). On our own motion, we now consolidate all of these cases for disposition in this opinion. As more fully explained below, we agree with Florida's District Courts of Appeal that section 322.34(1) is constitutional.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1995, the Legislature amended section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), to provide, in pertinent part, that a person who drives a motor vehicle upon Florida's highways while his or her driver's license or driving privilege is canceled, suspended or revoked (hereinafter "DWLCSR offense") is, upon a third conviction, guilty of a third-degree felony. See Ch. 95-278, § 1, at 2594, Laws of Fla. Previously, a second or subsequent conviction for a DWLCSR offense was a first-degree misdemeanor. See § 322.34(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994). As a result of the 1995 amendment, section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995) , sets forth in full:
(1) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s. 322.264, and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon:
(a) A first conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(b) A second conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
In each of the cases before us today, the State charged the defendant with at least one felony DWLCSR offense pursuant to section 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1995). Each defendant challenged the constitutionality of section 322.34(1), primarily arguing that the statute constitutes an improper delegation of legislative power to the judiciary. See Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. ("The powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein."). More specifically, the defendants asserted that because a trial court may, pursuant to section 948.01, Florida Statutes (1995), withhold an adjudication of guilt with regard to a DWLCSR offense, the trial court therefore has the authority to determine whether a third or subsequent DWLCSR offense constitut
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