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State v. Blackwell7/14/2000
Norley, the trial court's order did not set a specific time for Blackwell to complete the independent analysis. Second, the record shows that Blackwell took steps to accomplish the analysis within one month of the trial court's order. The trial court's order is dated March 26, 1998. The prosecutor called the State Crime Lab on Blackwell's behalf to arrange for independent testing. Although the record does not show when this call occurred, the prosecutor's April 28 letter to Blackwell's attorney states that the crime lab had confirmed the destruction of the sample, implying that the first contact with the lab occurred before April 28. Thus, Blackwell -- or the prosecutor acting on his behalf --acted within one month of the trial court's order. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that Blackwell waived his right to an independent test.
2. Even though Blackwell did not waive his right to an independent test, the trial court lacked authority to dismiss the drug charges in the indictment unless prosecution would violate Blackwell's constitutional rights. The trial court concluded that prosecution would result in a due process violation, and we uphold that ruling.
(a) First, we address the assertion of the dissenting opinion by Judge Andrews that the issue of due process was not raised in the trial court. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Under this clause, "criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness." The United States Supreme Court has long held that fundamental fairness "require that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense," including the right of access to exculpatory evidence.
At the hearing on Blackwell's motion to dismiss, Blackwell's counsel argued to the trial court that allowing the State to present evidence of the crime lab's test result would violate "fundamental fairness," and the trial court agreed. Although the trial court did not specifically mention the due process clause, the court repeatedly referred to the State's destruction of the urine sample as "fundamentally unfair," which is the gravamen of a due process violation. And the court gave no other basis for its ruling. Thus, it seems clear that Blackwell's motion and the trial court's ruling were based on constitutional due process, even if those words were not used. There should be no sophisticated way to say "due process" or whatever is fundamentally fair. Thus, we may properly consider the constitutional issue here.
(b) "The practice of destroying evidence without prior notice to the accused has been soundly denounced." The State has a constitutional obligation to preserve "evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense." Accordingly, our Supreme Court has recognized that
here the defendant's conviction or acquittal is dependent upon the identification of substance as contraband, due process of law requires that analysis of the substance not be left completely within the province of the state.
In California v. Trombetta, the United States Supreme Court held that the State violates a defendant's right to due process when it destroys evidence that has "constitutional materiality" - i.e., evidence that (1) has "an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed" and (2) is "of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means."
In Trombetta, the defendants, who were prosecuted for drunk driving, challenged th
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