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State v. Blackwell7/14/2000
cts, the Court concluded that the exculpatory value of the semen evidence was not known to the state when the state allegedly mishandled it. Rather, "this evidence was simply an avenue of investigation that might have led in any number of directions." The evidence did not meet the standard announced in Trombetta because "no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant." Accordingly, the Court held that a state's failure to preserve evidence that is only "potentially useful" does not violate due process unless the defendant can show that the state acted in bad faith. The bad faith requirement avoids
imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.
Although Georgia courts have not squarely addressed this issue, numerous courts from other jurisdictions have concluded that Youngblood's bad faith requirement does not apply where - as here - the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent before its destruction, and there is no reasonably available comparable evidence. In other words, only if the two requirements of Trombetta are not met does the good or bad faith of the State becomes relevant.
As discussed above, Blackwell's urine sample was not "simply an avenue of investigation that might have led in any number of directions," as was the case in Youngblood. It was not merely "potentially useful." Rather, it was the sole basis for the prosecution of Blackwell, and the results of the tests performed on it were "essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case." Most importantly, the exculpatory value of the urine was obvious before it was destroyed because the State had previously tested it and found no evidence of drugs. Youngblood does not apply here, and Blackwell did not have to show that the State acted in bad faith.
(d) But even if Blackwell did have to show bad faith, the trial court implicitly found bad faith here based on the State's disregard of its discovery order, and the record supports that finding.
In Youngblood, the Court asserted that he presence or absence of bad faith by the police for purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.
A finding of bad faith is reserved for "those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant." Because the presence or absence of bad faith depends on the facts of a particular case, this Court will accept a trial court's determination as to whether the State acted in bad faith if there is any evidence to support it. Although the trial court did not explicitly use the phrase "bad faith," the transcript from the hearing on Blackwell's motion to dismiss shows that the court believed the State violated an obligation to preserve the evidence until Blackwell could analyze it in accordance with the court order.
According to the prosecutor, the evidence was not destroyed until May 5 or 15. The trial court believed the prosecutor and accepted this date, as it was entitled to do. Therefore, the evidence was destroyed not only without notice to Blackwell, but after Blackwell had specifically sought an independent analysis, after a court order was in place permitting such an analysis, after the crime lab was notified that Blackwell wanted the evidence, and after the State represented to Blackwell that the sample was unavailable. The questionable timing of the destruction
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