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State v. Wickerham8/29/2000
rested Defendant. Barnett simply stopped Defendant and obtained his driver's license, then called for back up. Barnett's stop of Defendant was an investigative detention pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). Although an investigative detention is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, it is not necessarily a full custodial arrest. See, State v. Childress, 828 S.W.2d 935, 945 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992).
Defendant contends that he was de facto arrested. A de facto arrest occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes when the officer's conduct is more intrusive than necessary for an investigative stop. United States v. Hill, 91 F.3d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 1996). In considering whether a de facto arrest has occurred, the court considers the length of the stop, whether the suspect was handcuffed or confined in a police car, whether the suspect was transported or isolated, and the degree of fear and humiliation caused. Id.; State v. Pfleiderer, 8 S.W.3d 249, 255-56 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999).
Here, none of the factors indicates Defendant was de facto arrested. Defendant was briefly detained while Barnett checked his driver's license and called for back up. Defendant remained in his vehicle and was not handcuffed or confined in the police car. He was not transported or isolated, and there is no evidence to show Barnett subjected him to any fear or humiliation. Barnett did not arrest Defendant, de facto or otherwise. Moreover, there is some question of whether a de facto arrest would even implicate the provisions of Section 79.055, RSMo 1994 or Chapter 590.
As Barnett did not arrest Defendant, it is irrelevant whether he was certified pursuant to Section 79.055, RSMo 1994. We note, however, it is unclear from this record whether Section 79.055, RSMo 1994, even applied to Barnett, because no evidence shows whether he had been elected to his first term or whether he had received any extension. Section 79.055, RSMo 1994, applies only to a "person elected to his first term as city marshal" and further, provides an extension may be granted if a proper course is unavailable.
The judgment is affirmed.
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