State v. Golphin8/25/2000
State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 422, 284 S.E.2d 437, 454 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932, 72 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1982), we held N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e), which sets forth the aggravating circumstances the jury may consider, made the defendant fully aware of what the State had to prove before a death sentence could be imposed.
As to defendants' motions to disclose the aggravating circumstances, this Court has held a trial court may not require the State to disclose which aggravating circumstances it intends to rely on at the sentencing phase. See State v. McKoy, 323 N.C. 1, 44, 372 S.E.2d 12, 36 (1988), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990); State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 153, 362 S.E.2d 513, 531 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988). In addition, we have stated that N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e) sets forth the only aggravating circumstances upon which the State may rely in seeking the death penalty, and the "notice provided by this statute is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process." Holden, 321 N.C. at 154, 362 S.E.2d at 531.
The United States Supreme Court's recent opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, ___ U.S. ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___, 68 U.S.L.W. 4576 (2000), does not affect our prior holdings regarding the inclusion of aggravating circumstances in an indictment. The Supreme Court cites its previous holding in Almendarez-Torres that differentiates aggravating circumstances from elements of a crime and notes that it "has previously considered and rejected the argument that the principles guiding our decision today render invalid state capital sentencing schemes." Apprendi, ___ U.S. at ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d at ___, 68 U.S.L.W. at 4584-85; see also Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 358.
Considering the Supreme Court's continued recognition of the difference between elements of a crime and the aggravating circumstances in a capital sentencing procedure, see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 111 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1990), our prior holdings are consistent with the decisions in Jones and Apprendi. Therefore, as we stated previously, an indictment need not contain the aggravating circumstances the State will use to seek the death penalty, see Young, 312 N.C. at 675, 325 S.E.2d at 185, and the trial court may not order the State to disclose the aggravating circumstances upon which it intends to rely, see Holden, 321 N.C. at 153, 362 S.E.2d at 531. Thus, in the instant case, the lack of aggravating circumstances on the indictment did not create error, and the trial court did not err in denying defendants' motions to order disclosure of the aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, these assignments of error are overruled.
By assignment of error, Tilmon argues the trial court committed error and denied him due process of law when it denied his pretrial motion to sever the cases and overruled his objections to improper joinder. We disagree.
The facts show that on 10 February 1998, Tilmon moved for severance of his case from that of Kevin to allow the pursuit of antagonistic defenses, to promote a fair determination of guilt or innocence, and to prevent a prejudicial outcome. Citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968), Tilmon contended each defendant made out-of-court statements regarding the other defendant; and citing State v. Marlow, 310 N.C. 507, 313 S.E.2d 532 (1984), Tilmon argued he and Kevin had irreconcilable differences. Subsequently, on 16 February 1998, the State made a motion to join the cases on the grounds the several offenses charged were part of a common scheme or plan; were part of the same act or transaction; and were so closely connected
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