State v. Golphin8/25/2000
sary to protect a defendant's right to a speedy trial, or it is found necessary to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of one or more defendants; or
b. If during trial, upon motion of the defendant whose trial is to be severed, or motion of the prosecutor with the consent of the defendant whose trial is to be severed, it is found necessary to achieve a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of that defendant.
(3) The court may order the prosecutor to disclose, out of the presence of the jurors, any statements made by the defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence at the trial when that information would assist the court in ruling on an objection to joinder of defendants for trial or a motion for severance of defendants. N.C.G.S. § 15A-927(c) (1999).
Thus, "the trial court must deny joinder for trial or grant a severance of defendants whenever it is necessary to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of one or more defendants." Pickens, 335 N.C. at 724, 440 S.E.2d at 556.
We have said the presence of antagonistic defenses does not, standing alone, warrant severance. Id. at 725, 440 S.E.2d at 556. Additionally, "` he test is whether the conflict in defendants' respective positions at trial is of such a nature that, considering all of the other evidence in the case, defendants were denied a fair trial.'" State v. Lowery, 318 N.C. 54, 59, 347 S.E.2d 729, 734 (1986) (quoting Nelson, 298 N.C. at 587, 260 S.E.2d at 640); see also Pickens, 335 N.C. at 725, 440 S.E.2d at 556. To determine whether the positions of the defendants are so antagonistic, or conflicting, as to be prejudicial, this Court has stated the trial court should grant severance when necessary to avoid an evidentiary battle between the defendants "where the state simply stands by and witnesses `a combat in which the defendants [attempt] to destroy each other.'" Nelson, 298 N.C. at 587, 260 S.E.2d at 640 (quoting People v. Braune, 363 Ill. 551, 557, 2 N.E.2d 839, 842 (1936)) (alteration in original).
The State in the instant case did not stand by and rely on Kevin's statement to prove its case. See State v. Green, 321 N.C. 594, 601, 365 S.E.2d 587, 591-92 (holding the State did not rely on the co-defendant's testimony, but was able to show independent evidence of defendant's guilt), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900, 102 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1988). In his statement, Kevin claimed he was debilitated by pepper spray, and while in this condition, he heard gunshots. To rebut Kevin's claim, the State offered contrary evidence on the effects of pepper spray. Contrary to Tilmon's argument and to his benefit, the State's rebuttal evidence actually disproves Kevin's statement. Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence, including the testimony of several eyewitnesses, of Tilmon's involvement in the crimes. See Evans, 346 N.C. at 232, 485 S.E.2d at 277 (holding there was plenary evidence, irrespective of the co-defendant's statement, that defendant was involved). This rebuttal evidence, along with the direct evidence of Tilmon's involvement in the crimes, shows the State was not a mere witness to an evidentiary battle between Kevin and Tilmon.
Tilmon also argues the trial court should have severed defendants' trials because Kevin's out-of-court statement to police could not be adequately "sanitized" so as to avoid violating Bruton.
In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held admission of a statement by a non-testifying co-defendant, which incriminates the other defendant, at a joint trial, violated that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. See Evans, 346 N.C. at 231, 485 S.E.2d at 277. Bruton applies to t
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