State v. Golphin8/25/2000
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Additionally, " he clerk shall, at the beginning of court, swear all jurors who have not been selected as grand jurors." N.C.G.S. § 9-14 (1999) (emphasis added). In the context of swearing in prospective jurors, we have previously defined the phrase "at the beginning of court" as "the beginning of the [session] of court." State v. McNeill, 349 N.C. 634, 643, 509 S.E.2d 415, 420 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 145 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1999).
In the instant case, Tilmon argues the trial court should have moved Smith to a later panel and then sworn her in at the time she was called, which would have been two years after her prior jury service. However, N.C.G.S. § 9-14 mandates that prospective jurors be sworn in at the beginning of court, which we have held refers to the beginning of the session of court. See N.C.G.S. § 9-14; McNeill, 349 N.C. at 643, 509 S.E.2d at 420. Therefore, the trial court did not have the authority to swear Smith in at a later time. Because Smith could not be sworn in at the beginning of the session of court as the statute requires, the trial court did not err in excusing her for cause. Tilmon's assignment of error is overruled.
By assignments of error, both Kevin and Tilmon argue the trial court erred by allowing the State to exercise peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of their state and federal constitutional rights. Specifically, defendants contend the State's reasons for excusing prospective jurors Deadra Holder and John Murray were pretextual, and the trial court did not conduct an adequate inquiry. We disagree.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 26 of the Constitution of North Carolina forbid the use of peremptory challenges for a racially discriminatory purpose. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 80 (1986); State v. White, 349 N.C. 535, 547, 508 S.E.2d 253, 262 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1026, 144 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1999). "In Batson the United States Supreme Court set out a three-pronged test to determine whether a prosecutor impermissibly excluded prospective jurors on the basis of their race." State v. Bonnett, 348 N.C. 417, 433, 502 S.E.2d 563, 574 (1998) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405 (1991)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1124, 142 L. Ed. 2d 907 (1999).
In the first prong of the Batson test, a criminal defendant must establish a prima facie case that a peremptory challenge was exercised on the basis of race. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405. All relevant circumstances are considered, including the "defendant's race, the victim's race, the race of key witnesses, questions and statements of the prosecutor which tend to support or refute an inference of discrimination, a pattern of strikes against minorities, or the State's acceptance rate of prospective minority jurors." White, 349 N.C. at 548, 508 S.E.2d at 262; see also State v. Hoffman, 348 N.C. 548, 550, 500 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1998).
In the second prong, the burden shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral reason for striking the particular juror. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405; Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 433, 502 S.E.2d at 574. The State's explanation must be clear and reasonably specific, but does not have to rise to the level of justifying a challenge for cause. See Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 433, 502 S.E.2d at 574; State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 498, 391 S.E.2d 144, 151 (1990). Moreover, "` nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.'" Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 433, 502 S.E.2d at 574-7
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