State v. Golphin8/25/2000
6 S.E.2d at 27). Therefore, we need not address Kevin's allegation that the note was seized in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights.
We now turn to Kevin's claims that the note was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. It is well settled that " he North Carolina Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings." State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 31, 478 S.E.2d 163, 179 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1124, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (1997). "Evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, and may include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (e) and (f)." N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(a)(3) (1999); see also State v. Daughtry, 340 N.C. 488, 517, 459 S.E.2d 747, 762 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1079, 133 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1996). Because the State can present any evidence that is competent and relevant to the submitted aggravating circumstances, "trial courts are not required to perform the Rule 403 balancing test during a sentencing proceeding." State v. Flippen, 349 N.C. 264, 273, 506 S.E.2d 702, 708 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1135, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1015 (1999).
In the instant case, the State offered five statutory aggravating circumstances in Kevin's sentencing proceeding for the murder of Trooper Lowry, including N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(9) -- that the murder of Trooper Lowry was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. This Court has previously held "` t is not merely the specific and narrow method in which a victim is killed which makes a murder heinous, atrocious, and cruel; rather, it is the entire set of circumstances surrounding the killing.'" State v. Stanley, 310 N.C. 332, 338-39, 312 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1984) (quoting Magill v. State, 428 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1983)); see also State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 63, 436 S.E.2d 321, 357 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 129 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1994). Evidence that a murder was racially motivated can be used to show the "depravity of defendant's character." State v. Moose, 310 N.C. 482, 500, 313 S.E.2d 507, 519 (1984). The evidence of racial motivation then becomes a key factor because the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance is appropriate "when the killing demonstrates an unusual depravity of mind on the part of the defendant." Kandies, 342 N.C. at 450, 467 S.E.2d at 84.
Kevin's note contained references to "the beast" and "Babylon," which were interpreted at trial to mean "the police" and "Caucasian-run America," respectively. The references in Kevin's note are evidence that the murders were racially motivated; therefore, the jury could properly consider the note when determining if the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(9). This assignment of error is overruled.
In two assignments of error, Tilmon contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine Dr. John Warren, an expert in the field of forensic psychology, regarding Dr. Warren's potential bias. Tilmon argues certain questions asked by the prosecutor were improper and resulted in a denial of his federal and state constitutional rights to a fair sentencing hearing. Tilmon claims the questions concerning the fees charged by Dr. Warren for testimony in indigent cases, his ownership of a plane, places where he would not testify, and a highly publicized case in which he was involved were improper. However, Tilmon failed to object to any questions asked or answers given during the portion of the cross-examination when these topics were discussed.
To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must make a timely objection. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). As Tilmon did not objec
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