State v. Steen8/18/2000
tly prejudicial nor predeterminative of the jury's verdict, or assisted the court for sentencing purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1987); Commonwealth v. Golston, 366 N.E.2d 744, 752 (Mass. 1977); People v. Ribowsky, 568 N.E.2d 1197, 1201 (N.Y. 1991). As the Minnesota Court of Appeals summarized in State v. Robinson, 476 N.W.2d 896, 903 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd as modified, 480 N.W.2d 644 (Minn. 1992), "a special interrogatory may be used in a criminal case if it relates solely to sentencing and does not tend to lead a jury to a finding of guilt."
[ ] In line with this reasoning, we have interpreted N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-02.1, which provides minimum prison terms for armed offenders, to require the jury to make a special finding that in the course of committing the offense, the accused was in possession of a dangerous weapon, an explosive, or a firearm. See, e.g., State v. Sheldon, 312 N.W.2d 367, 370 (N.D. 1981). This result was also called for by the statute, which specifically provides the mandatory prison terms apply "only when possession of a dangerous weapon, explosive, destructive device, or firearm has been charged and admitted or found to be true in the manner provided by law. . . ." N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-02.1 (emphasis added). On the other hand, the trial court rather than the jury, has the duty, in accordance with the terms of the statute, of determining dangerous special and habitual offender status under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-09. See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 1999 ND 242, 6-8, 603 N.W.2d 878.
[ ] We believe the trial court properly rejected the special interrogatory proposed by the prosecutor. Under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01.2(1)(a) and (2), a court is required to give a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment if a negligent homicide conviction is based in part on evidence of the person's operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and is prohibited from suspending the sentence "unless the court finds that manifest injustice would result from imposition of the sentence." The statute is silent about whether a judge or a jury is to decide whether a conviction is based in part on evidence of a person driving while under the influence of alcohol. Punishment, however, is not the concern of the jury. State v. Mounts, 484 N.W.2d 843, 845 (N.D. 1992); State v. Huber, 361 N.W.2d 236, 238 (N.D. 1985).
[ ] Because the statute provides no guidance and special verdicts and interrogatories in criminal cases are disfavored, we leave to the court, as part of the sentencing function, the duty to decide the factual issue whether a negligent homicide conviction is based in part on evidence of the defendant's operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The judge who has presided over the trial is able to assess whether evidence of driving under the influence of alcohol has played a part in the conviction. As a matter relevant to sentencing, it is proper for the judge, rather than the jury, to decide the question.
B.
[ ] Although the verdict form with the special interrogatory was erroneously submitted to the jury, an error is harmless and not grounds for reversal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(a) if it does not prejudice substantial rights of the accused. State v. Eugene, 536 N.W.2d 692, 696 (N.D. 1995). Our objective in reviewing non-constitutional trial error is to determine whether the error was so prejudicial that substantial injury occurred and a different decision would have resulted without the error. State v. Murchison, 541 N.W.2d 435, 442 (N.D. 1995).
[ ] The error in submitting the incorrect verdict form to the jury was not prejudicial to Steen because the form ins
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 North Dakota DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|