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Hollaway v. State8/23/2000
cy and desire to represent himself in the manner in which he saw fit. Hollaway was initially examined by a psychiatrist who recommended further evaluation and a psychologist who concluded that he was competent to stand trial. Hollaway was subsequently committed to Lakes Crossing Center, a decision which the district court later characterized as a "very, very close question in the first place." Several months after commitment, the district court reviewed the reports of a sanity commission, comprised of two psychiatrists and one psychologist, concluding that Hollaway was competent to stand trial. The district court agreed with this determination and found Hollaway competent to stand trial. The district court also concluded that Hollaway had the right to represent himself. Hollaway has not expressed dissatisfaction with the guilt or penalty phases of his trial and has not pursued this appeal. Therefore, I feel that remanding for a new penalty hearing is unwarranted.
The majority concludes that the imposition of Hollaway's sentence was improperly influenced in three ways. First, the majority cites the incident in which Hollaway's electronic stun belt was accidentally set off. The district court immediately excused the jury and ascertained that the belt had merely malfunctioned. After calling the jury back into the courtroom, the district court informed the jury that
" he corrections officers often ask with people who are charged with murder to use the latest technology. Mr. Hollaway is wearing a belt, an electric belt. It's only supposed to be used if the defendant causes some problem. Mr. Hollaway, not today, nor at any other day in this court, nor as far as I know in the jail, has caused any trouble at all. But he does have the belt on, and the court services officer in leaning over, he has the control in his pocket, just zapped Mr. Hollaway accidentally. That causes him to get quite a shock, an electric shock, and as I said, he did absolutely nothing to cause it. It was a pure accident. Every once in a while there are people that cause disruptions in court. Mr. Hollaway hasn't at any time done that."
The majority appears very focused on the fact that Hollaway did nothing to provoke the activation of the stun belt. However, it is clear from the above quotation that this fact was made abundantly clear to the jury by the district court. I conclude that it is unnecessary to remand this case for an entirely new sentencing phase based on an accident that was immediately explained to the jury and appropriately handled by the district court.
Second, the majority finds that the "holiday arguments" made by the prosecutor to the jury in closing arguments during the penalty phase were improper. In support of this finding, the majority cites Quillen v. State, 112 Nev. 1369, 929 P.2d 893 (1996). The prosecutor in Quillen "referred to Thanksgiving no fewer than eight times, stating on two occasions that [the victims] were having their 'Thanksgiving meal'" when they were attacked. Quillen, 112 Nev. at 1381, 929 P.2d at 901. In the instant case, the prosecutor only once stated to the jury that Whiting's family would have no more holidays with their daughter and their sister. I conclude that while improper, the prosecutor's comments clearly do not rise to the level of egregious conduct with which this court was concerned in Quillen.
Finally, the majority concludes that under the circumstances of this case, the jury required further instruction regarding its responsibilities in assessing the evidence during the penalty phase.
The majority first concludes that the jury was not instructed in the penalty phase that the statements, arguments, or opinions of counsel
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